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I. INTRODUCTION
The sense that our legal system enforces the rule of law and
provides litigants with equal justice may be based on perceptions
created by its most visible courts. The courts where high-profile,
high-stakes litigation and appellate review take place are fre-
quented by attorneys, studied by legal scholars, covered by the me-
dia, and no doubt shape our view of the legal system as a whole.
But the most visible courts are the tip of the iceberg and may not
be representative of what happens in the larger, more obscure part
of our system, such as those civil courts that handle “small claims,”
debt collection, landlord-tenant disputes, and the like. Litigants
are seldom represented by attorneys in such courts, and their cases
rarely make the news or are noticed by law professors. Yet whether
it is actually true that our legal system enforces the rule of law and
provides equal justice would seem to depend on what happens in
just such courts, as they are the legal system as most people experi-
ence it.
If we care about the rule of law, we presumably do not want
these so-called “lesser” courts to be places where high-minded
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precedents established by appellate courts go to die. If we care
about “access to justice,” we are presumably concerned about what
justice consists of and what access actually amounts to. If we think
the legal system matters to the health of civil society, then we must
be interested in what happens to most people in the legal system,
as their commitment to civil society is affected by their experience
with its institutions. Knowing what goes on in these lesser courts is
not simply knowledge for its own sake, but information that makes
it possible to have meaningful conversations about what we want
from our legal system.
To facilitate such discussion, this Article considers the implica-
tions of the findings of a multi-case study done of a civil trial court
and how it determined outcomes in a particular type of case involv-
ing unrepresented litigants. Every year, the court in question han-
dles hundreds of thousands of cases1 in which one or more of the
parties are unrepresented or likely to be unrepresented. Though
their claims are in some sense “small,” these litigants may raise seri-
ous issues. For example, the cases that were the subject of this re-
search were filed by tenants claiming that their rental housing
conditions were unhealthful or hazardous to them and their fami-
lies and that their landlords had failed to correct the problems—
actions based on the so-called “warranty of habitability.” The condi-
tions alleged included lack of heat and hot water, infestations of
rodents and insects, leaks and mold, and falling ceilings and other
structural problems. An examination of what happened in these
cases provides some insight into how the rule of law and equal jus-
tice are faring in the less-visible part of our legal system. Many
places have similar laws, as well as similar courts, similarly unrepre-
sented tenants, and similar economic conditions affecting the
housing market.2 Therefore, this research provides a glimpse that
could be more generally telling.
Studies of whether the courts that hear these kinds of cases
actually follow the law or provide equal justice are relatively rare.
These courts and the kinds of cases that are litigated in them tend
1 District Court of Maryland - Activity Report, July 2014 - June 2015, MD.COURTS,
http://mdcourts.gov/district/statistics/2015/fy2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZR9J-
JJAG].
2 See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 389, 394 (2011) (describing adoption of the warranty of habitability by
“almost every state’s legislature or courts”); see also Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Repre-
sentation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about When Counsel is Most Needed, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 47 (2010) (“Despite some variation in details, the core features
of the courts [that handle landlord-tenant cases] seem remarkably consistent.”).
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to be studied—when they are studied—through statistical evi-
dence. Case studies, by contrast, tend to be more time-consuming
and labor-intensive3 and have a more complicated reputation than
quantitative study.4 However, such qualitative research is nonethe-
less crucial to answering certain questions. Scholarship in this area
has consistently shown that tenants attempting to enforce the war-
ranty of habitability experience a low rate of success in court.5 In-
deed, Chester Hartman and David Robinson have remarked
regarding this research that “[s]tudies of the various courts have
shown that the failure to apply the law is rampant.”6 But, strictly
speaking, such research does not provide direct evidence that
these courts fail to follow the law and to provide equal justice. It is
possible that the low success rate of tenants indicates that they gen-
erally lack the facts necessary to win their cases, or that the law
around the warranty of habitability is not well-designed for address-
ing their particular problems. The statistical evidence does not di-
rectly answer the question of why certain litigants are unsuccessful.
Almost no case studies have been done of how such cases are actu-
ally adjudicated,7 but it is that kind of research that provides direct
3 ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 21 (5th ed. 2014).
4 Case studies are staples in many fields, including psychology, sociology, political
science, anthropology, social work, business, education, nursing, and community
planning. Id. at 4. However, “[t]he case study occupies a vexed position in the disci-
pline of political science. On the one hand, methodologists generally view the case
study method with extreme circumspection . . . At the same time, the discipline con-
tinues to produce a vast number of case studies, many of which have entered the
pantheon of classic works.” John Gerring, What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 341, 341 (2004) (citations omitted).
5 See generally Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metro-
politan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 8 (1973); Julian R. Birnbaum et al., Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’ Court of
No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93, 109 (1979); Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Re-
search on Self-Represented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations,
24 JUST. SYS. J. 163 (2003); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes
for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001); Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly
Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385 (1995); D. James Greiner &
Cassandra W. Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L. J. 2118 (2012); Rebecca L.
Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 51, 76 (2010).
6 Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 461, 479 (2003).
7 LEXIS searches and other inquiries reveal no published case study research in-
volving unrepresented litigants. The unpublished Ph.D. dissertation of David L. El-
dridge examines several cases, involving mostly represented litigants, from the
perspective of the discipline of social work (but also makes thoughtful points about
the law governing the cases). David L. Eldridge, The Making of a Courtroom: Land-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\19-1\CNY103.txt unknown Seq: 4  5-FEB-16 14:31
60 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:57
evidence of what courts are doing, and thus how and why these
litigants receive the results they do.
Some researchers have tried to assess the quality of justice in
these courts though surveys in which tenants are quizzed about
their experiences.8 And surveys may even show that the majority of
tenants believe they have been treated fairly.9 Under some theo-
ries, that result could perhaps be considered dispositive on the
question of whether these litigants received justice. However, such
research is not revealing about the actual quality of judicial deci-
sion-making, given that most non-lawyers are not well-situated to
evaluate whether their cases were determined in accordance with
law.
Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott suggest that the “ques-
tion of just outcomes may be the most important question of all” in
the research on these courts.10 But they did not try to answer that
question, because they concluded that “whether the litigant re-
ceived a just or appropriate outcome” is “subjective” and “one of
the most difficult questions for which to formulate accurate and
reliable measures for empirical analysis.”11 But if by “just or appro-
priate outcome” is meant one consistent with the law, and if the
law in a given area is fairly well-defined, then the question can be
answered with properly-conducted case studies as well as, if not bet-
ter than, statistical studies can answer other kinds of questions. Fur-
ther, to the extent that case studies are consistent with, and help
explain, statistical study, they are not an alternative or inferior
form of research so much as a complementary one that bears upon
questions that are not readily answerable by statistical study
lord-Tenant Trials in Philadelphia’s Municipal Court (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Pennsylvania), http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/
1001/ [http://perma.cc/3DFY-MYWC]. Some published work does discuss case stud-
ies as pedagogical tools. See, e.g., Michael Millemann, Case Studies and the Classroom:
Enriching the Study of Law through Real Client Stories, 12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIG., GEN-
DER & CLASS 219 (2012); Frank S. Bloch, Framing the Clinical Experience: Lessons on
Turning Points and the Dynamics of Lawyering, 64 TENN. L. REV. 989 (1997). In addition,
some published work does use tantalizing snippets from actual cases to illustrate a
point. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott,“Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s
Landlord-Tenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967, 1009-11
(1975).
8 See, e.g., GINA KUBITS ET AL., FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST. OF THE STATE OF MINN. RE-
SEARCH DIV., HOUSING COURT FAIRNESS STUDY 7-8 (2004), http://www.mncourts.gov/
Documents/4/Public/Research/Housing_Court_Fairness_(2004).pdf [http://perma
.cc/78B6-T2JF].
9 Id. at 30-31.
10 Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 5, at 178.
11 Id.
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alone.12
The “new legal realists” have been advocating for expansion in
the scope and methods of empirical work in legal scholarship to go
beyond statistical study. For example, Howard Erlanger, Bryant
Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse, and David
Wilkins have argued that we ought to be more concerned with “the
impact of law on ordinary people’s lives” and therefore should “in-
clude in our toolkit some of the social science methods best suited
for this task,” including “the qualitative methods developed by
fields like anthropology and history for examining everyday experi-
ence.”13 Similarly, Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer have called
for “an empiricism that adopts anthropological and sociological
approaches, in which academics leave their universities and investi-
gate the world.”14 Here, the goal is to study “the law in action”15 by
“tak[ing] account of people’s lived experience of the law in partic-
ular settings.”16 The multi-case study considered in this Article ex-
amines the phenomenon of how courts function in just such a way.
It provides information about how the courts work for ordinary
people, why they do what they do, and, accordingly, what might be
done to make them more effective at enforcing the rule of law and
providing equal justice.
The rule of law and equal justice under law are often de-
scribed as founding principles of our society. Of course, all but the
most naive are aware that these are aspirations that are not fully
achieved. But when such aspirations are truly more honored in the
breach, the damage is not simply to those who are misled and mis-
used by the system, but also to the reputation and viability of the
system itself. Thus, attention to “people’s lived experience of the
law” is no mere anthropological undertaking, or even directed at
reform that primarily benefits the least well off. Rather, it is a con-
12 See YIN, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that case studies answer “how” and “why”
questions that are difficult to address with statistical study); see also id. at 40 (noting
that properly-done case studies achieve analytic generalizability rather than statistical
generalizability); Gerring, supra note 4, at 353 (explaining that the case study and
other methods of research are “interdependent, and this is as it should be,” and such
other forms of research “may be desperately in need of in-depth studies focused on
single units”).
13 Howard Erlanger et al., New Legal Realism Symposium: Is It Time for a New Legal
Realism?: Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 340 (2005)
(footnote omitted).
14 Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79 (2009).
15 Id.
16 Erlanger et al., supra note 13, at 345.
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stitutive activity that focuses on what kind of system we want to
have.
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE MULTI-CASE STUDY
The fifty-nine cases17 examined for this multi-case study con-
17 The raw data used in this study are available on a Google drive administered by
the CUNY Law Review at the following address: https://drive.google.com/
folderview?id=0B-UGVRZjr5NobjlOaFZaaVpUQUU&usp=sharing. The data are acces-
sible from any computer, and consist of the case files and audio proceedings, identi-
fied by condensed versions of court-assigned case numbers, which have been
digitized. The condensed case numbers referred to throughout this Article are ac-
companied by full case citations and can be used to access the relevant raw data spe-
cifically referred to herein. The cases that were examined for this research are: Dixon
v. Thaylor, Case No. 010100000012012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 1-12);
Garris v. Camden Mgmt. Servs., Case No. 010100000022012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)
(on file as 2-12); Scales v. Cooke, Case No. 010100000052012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 5-12); Thompson v. Saffell, Case No. 010100000082012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (on file as 8-12); Myers v. Progressive Props., Case No. 010100000152012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 15-2012); Singleton v. Edgewood Apartments,
Case No. 010100089662012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16-12); Brown v.
Hamilton, Case No. 010100005002011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 500-2011);
Mason v. Fleming, Case No. 010100165052011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as
16505-11); Henson-Thomas v. Young, Case No. 010100166832011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 16683-11); Wellington v. Williamston, Case No. 010100246432011
(2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 24643-11); Williams v. Dunne Wright Prop.
Mgmt., Case No. 010100247342011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 24742-11);
Edwards v. Progressive Prop. Real Estate, Case No. 010100247982011 (2011 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (on file as 24798-11); Jones v. Gomez, Case No. 010100000182012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 18-12); McCray v. Godfrey, Case No. 01010000026012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 26-2012); Milner v. Thompson, Case No.
010100000282012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 28-2012); Robsinson v. CE
Reality, Case No. 010100000342012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 34-2012);
Peoples v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No. 010100000352012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City)( on file as 35-2012); Jordan v. HABC, Case No. 010100000362012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (on file as 36-2012); Gilbert v. Choi, Case No. 010100000392012 (2012 Dist.
Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 39-12); Perez v. May, Case No., 010100000442012 (2012 Dist.
Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 44-12); Marshall v. Mid Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No.
010100000532102 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 53-2012); Meade v. Md. Prop.
Mgmt., Case No. 010100000562012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 56-2012);
Sturgis v. Anomnachi, Case No. 010100000602012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file
as 60-12); Smith v. Dominion Mgmt., Case No. 010100000732012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 73-2012); Beverly v. Balt. Preferred Prop., Case No. 010100000752012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 75-12); Powell v. Harris, Case No.
010100000822012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 82-12); Dixon v. Rice, Case No.
010100000872012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 87-12); Dorsey v. Keyhole
Servs., Case No. 010100000902012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 90-2012); Pat-
terson v. Md. Maint. & Mgmt. Co., Case No. 010100000912012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 91-2012); Brown v. Sage Mgmt. Inc., Case No. 010100000922012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 92-2012); Harmon v. Ford, Case No.
010100000972012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 97-12); Boyd III v. Mayberry,
Case No. 010100000982012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 98-12); Parks v. Dick-
erson, Case No. 010100001102012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 110-12); Dukes
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sisted of the court filings and audio recordings for “rent escrow
actions” filed by tenants in Baltimore City District Court during a
period from 2011 to 2012.18 The cases for study were randomly
selected, though screened to target those in which there was at
least one appearance before a judge of the court that was on the
record, in order to gather information about how courts handled
these cases.19 The results of the research have already been shared
v. Denise, Case No. 01011172012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 117-2012); Cox
& Wray v. Kingsley, Case No. 010100001352012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as
135-12); Johnson v. Upton Cts. Edgewood Mgmt., Case No. 010100001362012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 136-12); Ames v. Willis, Case No. 010100001402012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 140-12); Guy v. Mei, Case No. 010100001522012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 152-2012); Robertson v. Roloqas, Case No.
010100001542012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 154-12); Barrett v. Lyle, Case
No. 010100001622012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 162-12); Stroud v. Progres-
sive Prop. Inc., Case No. 010100001682012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 168-
12); Davis v. North Ave. Equities LLC, Case No. 010100001702012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 170-12); Davida Moses-Jones v. Nat’l Prop. Mgmt, Case No.
010100001712012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 171-12); Dorothy Jones v. Terry
Coffman Jr., Case No. 010100001732012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 173-12);
O’Naya Frazier v. Dunn Wright/D&W Properties, Case No. 010100001742012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 174-12); Jean Minor v. Albert C. Murry Jr., Case No.
010100001772012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 177-12); Terri Jones v. Sum-
merfield Inv. Grp. LLC, Case No. 010100001852012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file
as 185-12); Tonia Curry v. Laura L Snuggs & William T., Case No. 010100000422012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 42-12); Horn v. Payne, Case No.
010100001632012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12); Maynor v. Hous. Auth.
Balt. City, Case No. 010100099072012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 9907-12);
Staton v. Dowling, DowCo Mgmt, Case No. 010100099192012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 9919-12); Howell v. Weingarten, Case No. 010100099202012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 9920-12); Brown v. Cloverdale Partners, LLC, Case No.
010100099212012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 9921-12); Dotson v. Pearson,
Case No. 010100099222012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 9922-12); Terry v.
Hooks, Case No. 010100099292012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 9929-12);
Donald v. German, Case No. 010100099402012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as
9949-12); Moore v. Encomienda, Case No. 010100099412012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (on file as 9941-12); Kacherovsky v. Ruby, Case No. 9943-12 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (final order) (on file as 9943-12).
18 Pronouns have been regularized in all descriptions herein of these cases, so that
tenants are “she,” judges “he,” and landlords “he,” to reflect the most common con-
stellation we saw in these cases and to avoid distracting changes where variation
occurred.
19 The data for these cases studies were part of a larger research project in Balti-
more City District Court that collected materials from several types of cases where at
least one of the litigants was unrepresented and at least one appearance occurred on
the record before a judge. This Article is based on the first fifty (plus) cases studies of
rent escrow cases completed by graduate students for a research course using the
database. The graduate students signed up for the cases on a live spreadsheet that
identified the materials only by case number. The methodology for assembling the
database of materials for study was as follows. After a meeting was held advising the
court of the planned research, a calendar was made numbering the dates sequentially
backward from that day from 1 to 180. A random number generator was obtained
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with stakeholders, including judges of the court, to help verify the
validity of the research.20 In addition, these case studies reach a
general result that is consistent with the findings of statistical re-
search in the area, insofar as they show unrepresented tenants ob-
taining relatively little success in enforcing the warranty of
habitability in court, which indicates that this research is reliable.21
Indeed, the failure of tenants to benefit much from the war-
ranty of habitability is evidently long-standing and widespread. In
the 1970s, after the warranty was first widely adopted, researchers
in Chicago and Detroit were already warning of the “miniscule in-
court impact of the new legislation”22 and sounding alarms that
tenants seemed little better off than when they had no enforceable
rights to livable housing.23 Twenty years later, Barbara Bezdek’s ex-
tensive empirical study of the enforcement of the warranty in Balti-
more found that “[d]espite the enactment of tenant-protective
legislation in the mid-1970s, the rent court operates in virtually the
same manner as it did” before, with tenants seldom obtaining the
relief available under law.24 More recently, Paris Baldacci observed
that “[t]he plight of pro se litigants in New York City’s Housing
Court and the broad outlines of some solutions have been recog-
nized for at least two decades,” leading him to fear that his latest
article on the subject would become “just one more . . . in a series
. . . with little impact on the day-to-day experience of pro se liti-
online for numbers 1 to 180. The graduate student researchers looked at the dockets
on dates according to the numbers determined by the random number generator
and collected whatever cases were on the calendar on that date where at least one
litigant was unrepresented and at least one appearance occurred on the record
before a judge. After more than one hundred cases were collected using this method,
the court lost the six months of paper docket sheets during a remodeling, and a new
method had to be devised. The court agreed to allow the graduate assistant research-
ers to go to the records office once a week and pull twenty files at random where the
filing was prior to the date the research was begun, and from these files to select for
collection those cases that had at least one party unrepresented by counsel and at
least one appearance on the record before the court. The remaining approximately
200 cases in the database were collected in this manner. Though random selection of
cases is not considered important to case study design, it was approximated here on
the theory that it would improve the chances of finding representative cases and valid
replication evidence. See YIN, supra note 3, at 52, 61.
20 See id. at 198-99 (explaining that review of case studies not merely by peers but
also by participants increases the construct validity of the research).
21 Id. at 47.
22 Mosier & Soble, supra note 5, at 33.
23 Birnbaum et al., supra note 5, at 109-11.
24 Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Te-
nants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 533-34 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
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gants . . . .”25 The consensus, as David Super summed it up, is that
the warranty of habitability has done little to aid tenants with sub-
standard housing, in multiple jurisdictions across four decades.26
Nonetheless, it is not unusual for the courts handling these
kinds of cases to say that they follow the rule of law and endeavor
to dispense equal justice to all litigants. And the court that is the
subject of this multi-case study describes itself in just such terms.
The Mission Statement of the Maryland District Court states that it
will “ensure that every case tried herein is adjudicated expedi-
tiously, courteously, and according to law . . . .”27 Further, it
promises it will “provide equal and exact justice for all who are
involved in litigation before the Court.”28 It even claims “unwaver-
ing and unyielding” commitment to these goals.29
And, as is true with many of the laws regarding the warranty of
habitability, the law that the Baltimore City District Court enforces
gives the impression of being generally beneficial. The city’s rent
escrow statute allows a tenant with serious housing code violations
to pay her rent into a court-administered escrow account rather
than to the landlord, and to obtain various other remedies includ-
ing orders directing the landlord to make repairs, abating the rent
paid to the landlord or into escrow to reflect the conditions, and
awarding the tenant the amount paid into escrow in whole or in
part.30 Maryland’s highest court explained in Neal v. Fisher that this
law is “remedial legislation” and should be interpreted “in a way
that will advance [its] purpose, not frustrate it.”31 Further, a tenant
may seek an offset against the rent for breach of the warranty of
fitness for human habitation to reflect the “reasonable rental
value” of the property in its deteriorated condition, going back to
the date of first notice to the landlord of the conditions, as a claim
25 Paris R. Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se
Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 659, 660 (2006).
26 Super, supra note 2, at 458 (“Although appealing in the abstract, the new re-
gime of landlord-tenant law inaugurated four decades ago has failed at achieving any
of its major goals.”).
27 About District Court, DIST. COURT OF MD., http://www.mdcourts.gov/district/
about.html [http://perma.cc/JB3V-8AVA].
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 BALT. CITY PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9 (2015), http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/Portals/
0/Charter%20and%20Codes/ChrtrPLL/02%20-%20PLL.pdf [http://perma.cc/VA
65-U5CG]. Maryland has both State and local laws providing for rent escrow. See id.;
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211 (2012). The State law defers to the local law. See
id. § 8-211(o). Accordingly, § 9-9 governs this situation.
31 Neal v. Fisher, 312 Md. 685, 693 (1988).
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joined to the rent escrow action.32 Accordingly, it might seem as if
tenants have appropriate legal mechanisms for affirmatively ad-
dressing poor housing conditions in court.
However, our findings suggest that unrepresented tenants face
difficulties accessing the law’s benefits. Even from the beginning of
the case, the form petition frustrates tenants from pleading the rel-
evant facts or requesting the appropriate remedies. Indeed, almost
no tenants were able to accurately fill out the needlessly legalistic
form. The form expects, for example, that tenants state whether
they want relief based on violation of the “warranty of habitability”
and the “covenant of quiet enjoyment,” terms which have no mean-
ing to these tenants or even most lay people.33 To compound the
problem, in the cases that we saw, judges seemingly ignored what
was pleaded in the rent escrow petition (even though in Maryland
the petition is required to be verified by the tenant). We did not
see a judge make explicit or implicit reference to the petition in
any case that we examined, even when it provided detailed factual
averments or requests for particular remedies.
However, the inadequacy of the form petition cannot itself be
blamed for the poor results obtained by tenants in these cases.
Shortcomings in the pleadings do not themselves affect entitle-
ment to relief—Maryland’s District Court rules call for all plead-
ings to be “construed to do substantial justice,”34 and the rent
escrow law itself indicates that in disposing of the case the court
“shall make any order that the justice of the case may require.”35
Accordingly, most problems with how tenants fill out the petition
could be, and are supposed to be, addressed by the court’s effort to
do justice.
What more greatly impeded tenants’ access to the law’s relief
may have been the court’s failure to elicit and find the relevant
facts, even though the rent escrow law explicitly requires it to do
so.36 The form for making findings of fact that can be found in
most of the court files for these cases was left blank in every case
that we looked at. Occasional shorthand notations were made on
32 See PUB. LOC. L. § 9-14.2(d) (“[Damages for violation of the warranty] shall be
computed retroactively to the date of the landlord’s actual knowledge of the breach
of warranty and shall be the amount of rent paid or owed by the tenant during the
time of the breach less the reasonable rental value of the dwelling in its deteriorated
condition.”); Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 361 Md. 143 (2000).
33 See MD. R.C.P. DIST. CT. R. 3-303(b) (“Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required.”).
34 See id.
35 PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(f).
36 Id. (“The court shall make findings of fact on the issues before it . . . .”).
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other forms, but they were cursory and did not amount to factual
findings, nor did the judges make many remarks in the audio re-
cordings of these proceedings that could be construed as findings
of fact. Without explicit findings of facts, or the endeavor to make
them, tenants’ entitlement to particular legal remedies was often
left inchoate and unexplored.
But the biggest problem for tenants was that the law seemingly
played little role in how the judges disposed of these cases. Judges
seldom made explicit reference to the law or explained their deci-
sion-making in terms of the law. Even on the rare occasion where a
tenant pressed for an explanation for the court’s decision, the
judge generally did not invoke the law. For example, one replied,
“I heard from you at length, I heard from the defense and I made a
decision and that is what it is. So, if you would like to appeal it you
certainly can do that . . . .”37 Another simply announced, “Well,
that’s my decision,” and told the tenant she could appeal if she
paid the fee.38
Even when the court purported to apply the law, it tended to
be misinterpreted in ways that harmed tenants. For example, the
landlord has to be given a “reasonable” amount of time to make
repairs before a tenant can maintain a case, and the law establishes
a presumption of unreasonableness where the landlord fails to
make repairs within thirty days of receiving notice of the condi-
tions.39 Further, “actual notice” of the conditions from the tenant
to the landlord is sufficient.40 However, our case studies showed
that judges routinely gave landlords thirty days to make repairs from
the date of the first court appearance in the case,41 did not elicit evidence
of actual notice, and even ignored evidence on the record of actual
notice.42 For example, in a case where the housing inspection re-
port found twenty-eight violations, ten of which were serious
37 Rent Escrow Hearing at 9:35, Marshall v. Mid Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No.
010100000532102 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 53-12).
38 Rent Escrow Hearing at 28:24, Ames v. Willis, Case No. 010100001402012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 140-12).
39 See PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(d)(1) (“For the purposes of this subsection, what period
of time shall be deemed to be unreasonable delay is left to the discretion of the court
except that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a period in excess of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the notification by the landlord is unreasonable[.]”).
40 See id. §§ 9-14.1(b)(2)(c), 9-9(d)(1).
41 Rent Escrow Hearing at 1:18, Robertson v. Roloqas, Case No. 010100001542012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 154-12).
42 See, e.g., Rent Escrow Hearing at 5:44, Mason v. Fleming, Case No.
010100165052011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16505-11). In this case, nine
housing code violations were found, eight of which were serious, and the landlord did
not appear despite being served. The tenant testified that the landlord had been noti-
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enough to result in the issuance of a ten-day notice to the landlord
by the housing department, and the tenant offered to show the
judge emails to the landlord about the conditions, the judge disre-
garded them and said to the landlord, “I’d be happy to postpone
this and let you get it done without establishing escrow if you can
get it done in thirty days.”43 In another case, where there were
twenty violations, seven of which were serious, and where the ten-
ant testified that the landlord’s agent had been informed about the
conditions more than five months previously, with a list and walk-
through, the judge still said that the landlord had thirty (more)
days to make repairs.44 Such a misinterpretation of the statute takes
away any incentive for a landlord to make repairs when initially
told by a tenant about the conditions. And because judges seldom
developed evidence of actual notice to the landlord, any setoff
against the rent that was awarded to the tenant was reduced from
what it should have been, given that the court calculated it from
the court date rather than the date of actual notice to the landlord.
But, in any event, judges seldom awarded these tenants the
full relief to which they were legally entitled, even when they man-
aged to establish a prima facie case, notwithstanding the failure of
the court to explicitly find the facts or develop the evidence on
actual notice. For example, although the majority of cases involved
court-ordered inspections demonstrating the presence of housing
code violations and testimony regarding the failure of the landlord
to correct them, judges never ordered landlords to correct these
violations in any of the cases we saw, even though an order to cor-
rect is one of the remedies available under law.45
Although escrow accounts were much more frequently or-
dered by the court, they were still surprisingly sporadic for a pro-
ceeding called a “rent escrow action.” Our research showed that
escrows were set up less than half of the time on the first return
date where a prima facie entitlement to escrow was established.46
fied about the conditions three months previously. The judge stated that the viola-
tions “are going to have to be cleared up in 30 days.” Id.
43 Thompson v. Saffell, Case No. 010100000082012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final
order) (on file as 8-12); Rent Escrow Hearing at 5:00, Thompson v. Saffell, Case No.
010100000082012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 8-12).
44 Rent Escrow Hearing at 21:04, Jean Minor v. Albert C. Murry Jr., Case No.
010100001772012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 177-2012).
45 See PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(f)(8).
46 Such a case was indicated where the landlord had been properly served and had
notice of the conditions, did not establish that he had a viable defense, and a housing
inspection report established that serious housing code violations existed. In addition
to the other cases described herein, see Rent Escrow Hearing at 3:27, Brown v. Sage
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The general attitude of the court may have been expressed by the
judge who declined to set up an escrow in a case where inspections
more than three months apart showed that repairs had not been
made, when he remarked, “I believe we should postpone this and
see how things go.”47 However, it did not appear to be the case that
delaying escrow generally worked to the advantage of tenants, as
repairs were not made or were not completed by the next court
date in half of the cases where the court did not set up the escrow
account on the first court date. Perhaps that is not surprising, as
not setting up the escrow removes some of the leverage the law
presumably intended to give the tenant.
Even heat complaints failed to inspire a sense of urgency in
the court about establishing the escrow. For example, a tenant who
filed a case on February 6 and was first in court on February 21
informed the judge that she had told the landlord about her lack
of heat on January 23. Further, an inspection report documented
that there was no heat. The judge told the tenant that any escrow
would not be set up until the next court date of March 1, although
no reason was given for the delay.48 The law also requires heat
complaints to be given an expedited hearing,49 but that happened
in no case involving a heat complaint that we saw.
In one case, the tenant initially went along with the delay of
escrow, at the encouragement of the court.50 On the second court
date, when all the repairs had not been completed, though it was a
month later, escrow was still not established. The judge stated, “I
am not going to open an escrow account . . . I will indicate in the
Mgmt. Inc., Case No. 010100000922012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on
file as 92-2012); Dukes v. Denise, Case No. 01011172012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)
(final order) (on file as 17-12); McCray v. Godfrey, Case No. 01010000026012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 26-12); Williams v. Dunne Wright Prop.
Mgmt., Case No. 010100247342011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 24734-11);
Howell v. Weingarten, Case No. 010100099202012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)(final or-
der) (on file as 9920-12); Marshall v. Mid Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No.
010100000532102 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)(final order)(on file as 53-12); Rent Es-
crow Hearing at 1:06, Dorsey v. Keyhole Servs., Case No. 010100000902012 (2012 Dist.
Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 90-2012); Rent Escrow Hearing at 5:41, Patter-
son v. Md. Maint. & Mgmt. Co., Case No. 010100000912012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)
(final order) (on file as 92-2012).
47 Rent Escrow Hearing at 7:50, Myers v. Progressive Props., Case No.
010100000152012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 15-12).
48 Rent Escrow Hearing at 17:23, Davida Moses-Jones v. Nat’l Prop. Mgmt, Case
No. 010100001712012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 17-12).
49 See PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(h).
50 Rent Escrow Hearing at 5:30, Thompson v. Saffell, Case No. 010100000082012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 8-12).
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file tenant prefers to pay rent directly to [the] landlord.”51 Two
months later, the case was again in court for a status review of the
case. A reinspection found that nine violations were still outstand-
ing.52 The judge asked, “Why are we here, if there is no escrow
account?”53 and “I don’t know why we are here, literally, is what
I’m trying to tell you.”54 Presumably, the tenant felt much the same
way.
In a case where there were thirteen violations, four serious,
the judge asked the tenant, “Were you in the courtroom when I
first came in and I said one of the things that has to happen before
we can set up escrow is that not only do the life, health, or safety
violations have to be, uh, proven, but we have to give the landlord a
reasonable opportunity to correct those conditions before we can
set up escrow?”55 In this particular case, the tenant stated that the
landlord knew about the conditions “before we moved in” over a
year ago and promised he would fix them.56 The representative for
the landlord did not dispute this testimony but responded that the
repairs could be done in “a day or two.”57 Rather than set up an
escrow account, the judge called for a reinspection twenty days
later, and said, “You have a chance to get these conditions cor-
rected, so, um, escrow has not been established, so that means the
rent technically is owed.”58 In other words, even though, according
to the record, the landlord had failed to correct the conditions for
over a year and had no reasonable explanation for the delay, the
court still would not establish the escrow.
In a case where the tenant had particularly serious violations—
namely an inoperable furnace in winter, a rat infestation, and
overfusing of electrical circuits—the judge accepted the landlord’s
suggestion that the escrow be delayed, remarking, “So we can do
that and defer the decision on the escrow . . . I mean, it will save
everybody a lot of aggravation.”59 It is not clear that the tenant falls
into the category of the “everybody” who considers the remedy an
51 Id. at 11:34.
52 Id. at 9:03.
53 Id. at 18:44.
54 Id. at 20:22.
55 Rent Escrow Hearing at 2:20, Brown v. Cloverdale Partners, LLC, Case No.
010100099212012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 9921-12).
56 Id. at 2:45.
57 Id. at 4:05.
58 Id. at 6:20–7:45.
59 Rent Escrow Hearing at 1:10, Brown v. Hamilton, Case No. 010100005002011
(2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 500-2011).
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aggravation, but when it is regarded as an aggravation by the court,
it is likely in any event to be avoided.
Another form of relief to which tenants are entitled under law
is an abatement of rent paid into escrow to reflect the lower value
of the housing in its defective condition.60 However, judges almost
never (only three times that we saw) abated the amount of rent to
be deposited into escrow.61 That was so even though most tenants
apparently established factual entitlement to abatement, and even
though the rent escrow law puts the burden on the landlord to
show cause why an abatement should not be granted.62 We only
observed one case where the judge asked the landlord why the rent
should not be abated.63 Judges usually ignored or refused tenants’
fairly frequent explicit requests to abate the rent going into es-
crow.64 The norm was instead for the judge to assume that the rent
going into escrow would not be abated, or even to state explicitly
that it could not be abated.65
Large numbers of violations and evidence of long-standing
failure to make repairs didn’t seem to make a difference. For ex-
ample, in a case in which the inspector found eight code violations,
and in which the tenant requested an abatement in court and al-
leged that she had given the landlord actual notice of the condi-
60 Abatement is to be in “such an amount as may be equitable to represent the
existence of the condition or conditions found by the court to exist.” BALT. CITY PUB.
LOC. L. § 9-9(f)(4) (2015).
61 Rent Escrow Hearing at 25:18, Henson-Thomas v. Young, Case No.
010100166832011 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16683-11); Rent Escrow Hear-
ing at 8:25, Gilbert v. Choi, Case No. 010100000392012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on
file as 39-12); Rent Escrow Hearing at 13:40–14:10, Horn v. Payne, Case No.
010100001632012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12).
62 PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(f)(4) (“In all such cases where the court deems that the ten-
ant is entitled to relief under this Act, the burden shall be upon the landlord to show
cause why there should not be an abatement of the rent.”).
63 Rent Escrow Hearing at 9:55, Horn v. Payne, Case No. 010100001632012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 163-12).
64 See Myers v. Progressive Props., Case No. 010100000152012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt.
City) (final order) (on file as 15-12); Marshall v. Mid Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No.
010100000532102 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 53-12); Smith v.
Dominion Mgmt., Case No. 010100000732012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 73-
12); Rent Escrow Hearing at 8:28, 12:54, Beverly v. Balt. Preferred Prop., Case No.
010100000752012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 75-12); Dukes v.
Denise, Case No. 01011172012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 17-
12); Rent Escrow Hearing at 11:20, Davis v. North Ave. Equities LLC, Case No.
010100001702012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 170-12); Moore v. En-
comienda, Case No. 010100099412012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file
as 9941-12); Davida Moses-Jones v. Nat’l Prop. Mgmt, Case No. 010100001712012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 171-12).
65 See Rent Escrow Hearing at 2:25–11:41, Brown v. Cloverdale Partners, LLC, Case
No. 010100099212012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 9921-12).
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tions two months previous to the filing of the petition, the judge
denied the relief without explanation.66 In another case in which
the housing inspection found thirty-two violations, of which seven-
teen were serious, the landlord did not appear on the March re-
turn date even though he was served.67 The tenant testified that
the landlord had known about the conditions described in the in-
spection report since June of the previous year.68 The judge estab-
lished the escrow account but did not abate any of the tenant’s
$900 monthly rent; in fact, the judge added a $45 late charge to
the amount because the tenant was a week late with the rent for
that month.69 While it might seem as if the landlord’s failure to
appear despite being served would make it difficult for him to meet
his burden of showing why an abatement should not be granted,
that case was not the only time we saw that happen.70
At the conclusion of these cases, when it came time to disburse
any escrow account or otherwise resolve claims based on the hous-
ing code violations, judges seldom gave tenants any meaningful
monetary award. Thirty-three of the fifty-nine cases comprised situ-
ations where tenants managed to make out a prima facie case of
entitlement to some monetary relief, whether abatement, damages,
or return of some portion of the escrow.71 Since the court often
did not elicit the facts on actual notice and other elements of the
right to relief, and some number of tenants seemed to give up on
the escrow action part of the way through it, this number probably
represents an undercount of the total who had a right to it, as well
as an underestimation of the extent of the relief to which they may
have been entitled. In any event, no monetary relief at all was
awarded by the court in nineteen of the thirty-three cases. In the
fourteen cases where some monetary relief was awarded to the ten-
ant, the amount was usually small, with the landlord generally re-
ceiving 75% of the lease rental amount or more. Further, the
66 See Moore v. Encomienda, Case No. 010100099412012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)
(final order) (on file as 9941-12).
67 Rent Escrow Hearing at 0:27, Scales v. Cooke, Case No. 010100000052012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 5-12).
68 Id. at 2:11.
69 Id.
70 Rent Escrow Hearing at 6:00, Davis v. North Ave. Equities LLC, Case No.
010100001702012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 170-12).
71 In those cases, there was evidence of serious housing code violations and either
notice was on the record (even if not actually elicited by the judge) or the matter was
in court long enough that the presumptively unreasonable period of more than 30
days had elapsed between the time of inspection finding the serious violations and the
time of ultimate repair. See BALT. CITY PUB. LOC. L. §§ 9-9(d)(1), 14.2(c) (2015); see
also Appendix for table of cases.
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amounts awarded to tenants did not appear to be well-correlated
with the seriousness of the conditions, and the judge seldom gave
any, or any legally-cognizable, explanation of how he arrived at the
amount awarded. It is difficult to reconcile these results with the
rent escrow law’s professed concern for housing conditions that
“constitute a menace to the health, safety, welfare and reasonable
comfort of its citizens,” and its “declar[ation] that the interests of
public policy require that meaningful sanctions be imposed upon
those who would perpetrate or perpetuate such conditions.”72
Some judges evidently perceived a very high bar to tenants ob-
taining monetary relief. For example, a judge denied a tenant any
portion of the rent escrow account, even though it had taken three
months for repairs, because the premises—which had been docu-
mented by a housing inspection report as having seven violations,
including four for mold—had not been rendered “unusable” by
the conditions.73 The law does not require that the housing be
unusable to justify monetary relief; it just has to have serious defi-
cits that reduce its value.74 Even where evidence actually indicated
that the premises were unfit for human habitation, judges tended
to think that the landlord still ought to get most of the rental
amount set forth in the lease. In one case, the tenant testified
about a serious rodent infestation dating back three years and had
an older inspection report to prove it, and the inspector testified as
well that there was “a bad rat infestation in the property, a lot of
openings . . . a lot of droppings throughout the property,” even
opining that the dwelling was unfit for human habitation “if you
have small kids” (which the tenant did).75 The judge awarded the
tenant a refund of only two months’ rent.76
In another case, the tenant established that she was without
heat from early November until mid-February and without hot
water for one-and-a-half months of this same period.77Additionally,
72 PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(a)(1), (4).
73 See Williams v. Dunne Wright Prop. Mgmt., Case No. 010100247342011 (2011
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 24734-11).
74 See PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(f)(4) (“[Rent should be abated in] an amount as may be
equitable to represent the existence of the condition or conditions found by the court
to exist.”).
75 Rent Escrow Hearing at 6:50, Garris v. Camden Mgmt. Servs., Case No.
010100000022012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 2-12).
76 Id. at 9:36.
77 Rent Escrow Hearing at 6:40–7:17, Horn v. Payne, Case No. 010100001632012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12); see also Horn v. Payne, Case No.
010100001632012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 163-12). This case
is covered in detail in Michele Cotton, A Case Study on Access to Justice and How to
Improve It, 16 J. L. & SOC’Y 61, 71-74 (2014).
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the housing inspector found a total of seventeen violations.78 The
record also showed that the landlord admitted he had notice from
the time of the first failure of the heat in early November.79 Al-
though the judge did indicate that he was abating $900 going into
the escrow account,80 the actual abatement amount may have been
only $50 (because the judge appears to have ignored the tenant’s
testimony that she had already paid November’s rent).81 In any
event, the tenant was required to pay the full rental amount for the
other months, and the escrow account was then returned in its en-
tirety to the landlord at the conclusion of the case when the repairs
were finally completed.82 Thus, the tenant received only a small
percentage of the $4,250 rent deposited during the five-month pe-
riod covered by the proceeding—probably only $50.83 The court is
seemingly not particularly receptive to heat complaints. In another
case where the tenant had gone without heat for most of the win-
ter, and where there were also other serious violations, the judge
awarded the tenant relief amounting to only one month’s rent.84
In a case where there were twenty-eight violations (twelve of
which were very serious), the tenant indicated that she had
brought emails with her, showing notice to the landlord. Although
the case stretched out to four hearings, and it took the landlord
four months to correct all the violations, the court awarded the
tenant no financial relief.85
In another case in which the landlord did not dispute the ten-
ant’s testimony that he had known about the need for the repairs
(thirteen violations, four serious) for over a year and had promised
to fix them, the court not only gave nothing to the tenant but actu-
ally awarded the landlord a judgment for two months’ rent that the
landlord said had not been paid.86
In a case that had been going on for eight months, and where
78 Rent Escrow Hearing at 4:00–5:06, Horn v. Payne, Case No. 010100001632012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12).
79 Id. at 10:00–10:43; Cotton, supra note 77, at 75, 78.
80 Rent Escrow Hearing at 13:27–14:10, Horn v. Payne, Case No. 010100001632012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12).
81 Id. at 5:45–6:40; 13:27–14:10; Cotton, supra note 77, at 81-82.
82 Rent Escrow Hearing at 17:00, Horn v. Payne, Case No. 010100001632012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 163-12); Cotton, supra note 77, at 80-81.
83 Id.
84 Brown v. Hamilton, Case No. 010100005002011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final
order) (on file as 500-2011).
85 Thompson v. Saffell, Case No. 010100000082012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final
order) (on file as 8-12).
86 See Rent Escrow Hearing at 2:25–11:41, Brown v. Cloverdale Partners, LLC, Case
No. 010100099212012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 9921-12).
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multiple inspections showed that the repairs had still not been
completed, the tenant finally restored the case to the court calen-
dar because her lease was coming to an end. The judge remarked,
“This case has gone on for eight months and has not been re-
solved. Usually, when a case goes on for six months, and I’m not
satisfied that the landlord has made some effort or good faith ef-
fort to resolve the issues, all of the money goes to the tenant.” The
judge was making an oblique reference here to the part of the rent
escrow law that states:
[W]here an escrow account is established by the court and the
condition or conditions are not fully remedied within six
months of the establishment of such account, and the landlord
has not made reasonable attempts to remedy the condition, the
court shall award all monies accumulated in escrow shall be dis-
bursed to the tenant [sic].87
The landlord made some general statements to the judge about
how difficult it had been to get the repairs done, which evidently
persuaded the judge to award him 70% of the amount in escrow.88
In addition to providing tenants with little of the relief availa-
ble under law, judges tended to put obstacles in their paths. For
example, they generally required tenants to deposit any alleged
rent arrears into escrow before they would proceed with the case.
As a result of the failure to meet this precondition, some tenants’
cases were summarily dismissed, regardless of the seriousness of
the housing code violations established by inspection.89 However,
the requirement that tenants deposit alleged rent arrears prior to
receiving an adjudication of whether the full amount of that al-
leged back rent is actually owed does not appear to be something
that the rent escrow law calls for. Further, the requirement of such
a deposit also appears to violate due process.
In fact, the form used by the court to order the deposit of
alleged rental arrears uses language that seems to have been taken
from an older, somewhat different version of the rent escrow law. It
states that it is “ordered that the tenant shall pay into court the sum
of $___ . . .  found by the court to be the amount of rent due and
87 BALT. CITY PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(g) (2015).
88 Rent Escrow Hearing at 25:18, Henson-Thomas v. Young, Case No.
010100166832011 (2011 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16683-11).
89 See Scales v. Cooke, Case No. 010100000052012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final
order) (on file as 5-12) (concerning a case with thirty-two violations, seventeen of
which were serious); see also Rent Escrow Hearing at 14:00, Guy v. Mei, Case No.
010100001522012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 152-2012).
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unpaid. . . .”90 A previous version of the rent escrow law indeed
calls for “payment by the tenant into court of the amount of rent
found by the court to be due and unpaid . . . .”91 However, this
previous version of the law applied when rent escrow was solely a
defense and not available as an affirmative action brought by the
tenant.92 And even that law required the deposit of an amount
found by the court to be due and unpaid, not a deposit as a precon-
dition to a finding by the court.93 Moreover, the current version of
the rent escrow law—which allows for the affirmative rent escrow
action by the tenant—does not use that language; it calls for “pay-
ment . . . of the amount of rent called for under the lease . . .
unless or until such amount is modified by subsequent order of the
court. . . .”94 That this requirement refers to prospective rent rather
than rent arrears is demonstrated by the fact that all the rent es-
crow law’s remedies (including rent abatement) are entirely pro-
spective in nature.95 A different statute, the implied warranty of
fitness for human habitation, deals with the retrospective remedy
of damages.96 In Williams v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the
Maryland Court of Appeals pointed out that the rent escrow law
applies to the “current situation” while previously accrued rent is
involved in the “breach of warranty action looking back for some
period.”97 Not only is requiring the deposit of alleged rent arrears
as a condition of proceeding inconsistent with the prospective-ori-
ented relief of the rent escrow statute, but it is also inconsistent
with how cases by the landlord for nonpayment of rent are han-
dled, which do not require the tenant to deposit alleged arrears
prior to adjudication.
Such a deposit requirement also appears to violate due pro-
cess. Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals explained the issue in
Lucky Ned Pepper’s Limited v. Columbia Park and Recreation Association,
which dealt with a law that required the deposit of all rent allegedly
due as a condition of obtaining a jury trial.98 The problem with a
90 See, e.g., Scales v. Cooke, Case No. 010100000052012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City)
(Order to Pay Rent Into Court) (on file as 5-12).
91 S.B. 130, ch. 459, § 1(b)(2), 1968 Md. Laws 832, 832-34 (current version at PUB.
LOC. L. § 9-9).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(d)(2).
95 Id. § 9-9(f).
96 Id. § 9-14.1(a)(2).
97 Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 361 Md. 143, 159-60 (2000).
98 Lucky Ned Pepper’s Ltd. v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n, 64 Md. App.
222, 230 (1985).
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pre-trial deposit requirement, the court explained, is that it “pre-
supposes a determination that the money is owed. ‘The word due
always imports a fixed and settled obligation or liability . . . .’ ”99
Accordingly, the court concluded that the rule requiring such de-
posit unreasonably interfered with the right to trial by jury.100 Simi-
lar logic suggests that a deposit of alleged arrears in order to gain
access to the rent escrow proceeding presupposes an obligation
that has yet to be determined, likewise depriving a tenant of due
process.
Nonetheless, judges often required tenants to deposit any al-
leged rent arrears before they would allow the maintenance of the
rent escrow action. In the case where the inspector had found
thirty-two housing code violations, the judge told the tenant that
she was lucky the landlord hadn’t shown up for that court date,
because then the case would probably have been dismissed imme-
diately because she had not brought the arrears with her to de-
posit.101 This perspective was common among the judges of the
court. For example, a judge stated to a tenant with regard to re-
quiring the deposit of the full amount of alleged arrears, “In order
to have a rent escrow case you have to pay the rent into the court,”
and made no allowance for the fact that the housing inspection
report listed multiple serious housing code violations that could
have represented damages claims by the tenant against such ar-
rears.102 Even in a case where a tenant actually pressed the court to
take the housing code violations into account, the judge said, “I am
not going to address any of that now. When the case is over with
and the money is distributed, you can raise those issues then.”103
He further informed the tenant that she had to pay the full
amount of the alleged arrears, or the rent escrow case would be
dismissed.104 As one judge explained to a tenant whose housing
inspection report established eight violations, five of which were
99 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)) (emphasis in original).
100 Lucky Ned Pepper’s Ltd., 64 Md. App. at 230.
101 Rent Escrow Hearing at 3:32, Scales v. Cooke, Case No. 010100000052012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 5-12).
102 See Rent Escrow Hearing at 2:05, McCray v. Godfrey, Case No. 01010000026012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 26-12). See also Myers v. Progressive Props., Case
No. 010100000152012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 15-12); Rent
Escrow Hearing at 8:24, 9:50, 21:05, 24:15, Ames v. Willis, Case No. 010100001402012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 140-12); Moore v. Encomienda, Case No.
010100099412012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 9941-12).
103 Rent Escrow Hearing at 13:23, Smith v. Dominion Mgmt., Case No.
010100000732012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 73-12).
104 Id. at 11:11.
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serious, “Did you see the movie Jerry Maguire? . . . In that movie,
they said, Cuba Gooding Jr. said, ‘Show me the money.’ So show
me the money, okay? You gotta pay it into the court . . . . This is not
rent avoidance, this is rent escrow . . . . You can’t have a case unless
you have the rent.”105
As these examples illustrate, the escrow that should have pro-
tected tenants and given them leverage against the landlord was
often treated as a cudgel against tenants. For example, in a case
where the tenant received her social security check every month on
the second Wednesday, she was repeatedly prevented from deposit-
ing the rent by the clerk’s office because, according to the judge’s
order, she was late, and so she had to repeatedly request judicial
intervention to permit it.106 In that case, the landlord had received
notice of the conditions in September of the previous year, and the
tenant filed the case in February (where twenty housing code viola-
tions, seven of which were serious, were found). Repairs weren’t
completed until June, after a proceeding that took six hearings in
the court.107 Each time the escrow payment was late over the
course of the proceedings, the court admonished the tenant.
When the judge permitted the late payment at the fifth hearing in
May, he said, “Now, I gave you a little extra leeway, but you need to
have made the payments when they were due, or the case gets dis-
missed. Do you understand that?” She responded, “I understand
that. But can I explain something to you?” He said, “Just acknowl-
edge that you have to do that.” The tenant could only respond,
“Okay.” At the end of the case, the tenant received no monetary
relief at all, according to the judge, “because everything has been
corrected and because the tenant has not been paying into the ac-
count the way she was supposed to.”108 The landlord didn’t make
the repairs the way he was supposed to, and he had no defense for
the delay, but received all the rent. The tenant suffered from multi-
ple serious housing code violations for nearly a year, but got no
offset.109 When she objected to the release of the entire escrow to
the landlord, the judge responded, “This is rent money. You can’t
105 Rent Escrow Hearing at 11:50, 15:15, Boyd III v. Mayberry, Case No.
010100000982012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 98-12).
106 See generally Rent Escrow Hearing, Jean Minor v. Albert C. Murry Jr., Case No.
010100001772012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 177-2012).
107 See id.
108 Id. at 50:10.
109 See Jean Minor v. Albert C. Murry Jr., Case No. 010100001772012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 177-2012).
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stay in a place for free. It’s not your money, it’s rent money.”110 It
seems as if some judges see their role as protecting landlords’
claims for rent, but not as protecting the tenants’ claims for dam-
ages for violations of the warranty of habitability.
It does make sense as a matter of efficiency for the court to
resolve all related claims in the rent escrow proceeding. If there is
in fact a claim on the part of the tenant for damages for violation
of the warranty, it should be joined to the rent escrow action (and
such joinder is called for by the law). And if the landlord has a
defense of unpaid rent against such a warranty claim, it makes
sense that that be considered as well. If the court then made an
adjudication based on such competing claims, without requiring
deposits by either party, then its decision-making would be both
efficient and just. But, perversely, not only did judges in these cases
often require tenants to deposit all alleged arrears in order to pro-
ceed, but they also generally declined to allow tenants to join their
related claims for damages for violation of the warranty of habita-
bility that were potential offsets against any alleged arrears. For ex-
ample, in one case in which nine housing code violations were
found, eight serious, the judge said to the tenant, in a frank mis-
statement of the law, “Are you aware that legally you cannot with-
hold rent simply because of the conditions of the property?”111 The
law explicitly states that tenants have a legal claim for damages
against back rent,112 and Maryland precedent makes clear that te-
nants must be allowed to join their warranty of habitability claims
to these actions.113 Nonetheless, judges in these cases often in-
formed tenants that such claims for damages were not allowed, or
simply refused to allow them.
In a case in which the tenant had had an infestation of bed-
bugs and had pictures and an associated hospital bill to document
the conditions114—and in which the landlord acknowledged pro-
110 Rent Escrow Hearing at 49:30, Jean Minor v. Albert C. Murry Jr., Case No.
010100001772012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 177-2012).
111 Rent Escrow Hearing, Garris v. Camden Mgmt. Servs., Case No.
010100000022012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 2-12).
112 See BALT. CITY PUB. LOC. L. § 9-14.2(b), (d) (2015) (stating that the breach of
the warranty may be maintained as a defense in a landlord’s action for summary eject-
ment or distress for rent).
113 See Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 361 Md. 143, 160 (2000). The Court of
Appeals found that it would not “do substantial justice to require a tenant to split his
or her claim[s].” Id. at 159.
114 Rent Escrow Hearing at 3:00, Singleton v. Edgewood Apartments, Case No.
010100089662012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16-12).
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viding several treatments for bedbugs115—the court awarded the
tenant no damages,116 even after looking at the pictures and re-
marking, “it’s pretty bad.”117 The judge raised the issue of dam-
ages,118 but said “I’m going to have [to] leave that between the two
of you.”119 When the tenant objected to paying rent for the previ-
ous two months,120 which was evidently when the infestation oc-
curred, the judge responded, “I’m going to have to rely on you all
to work that out,”121 and “rent does have to be paid, and if you
continue to have problems, what I’m suggesting is continue to doc-
ument it, like you are, and see if you’re able to work out an ex-
change, such as if you decide to get a new mattress. They may pay
that, but you [have to] keep receipts of all that, and you don’t —
.”122 The tenant said that she had gotten new mattresses and ad-
ded, “I have receipts.”123 The judge continued to sidestep the ten-
ant’s claim for damages, saying, “Certainly, if you sued, the court
would absolutely consider that.”124 The judge then dismissed the
case, awarding the tenant nothing.125
In a case in which the inspection showed twenty-five violations,
twelve of them serious, the tenant requested reimbursement for
the electric heater she had bought because her heat had not been
working from sometime in December until January 28.126 When
she added that she was moving out in March, the judge said, “Well,
there’s really no reason to have this case then” and added, “You’re
going to owe the rent if you’re moving.”127 He terminated the lease
as of March 15 and dismissed the case, awarding no damages to the
tenant.128
In addition, we saw cases where tenants were whipsawed and
unable to assert claims based on their housing conditions at all:
115 Id. at 1:30.
116 Singleton v. Edgewood Apartments, Case No. 010100089662012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 16-12).
117 Rent Escrow Hearing at 4:09, Singleton v. Edgewood Apartments, Case No.
010100089662012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 16-12).
118 Id. at 4:29.
119 Id. at 4:36.
120 Id. at 5:12.
121 Id. at 5:40.
122 Id. at 6:15.
123 Id. at 6:32.
124 Id. at 6:46.
125 Id. at 7:16.
126 Rent Escrow Hearing at 0:35, 4:10, Barrett v. Lyle, Case No. 010100001622012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 162-12).
127 Id. at 5:44.
128 Id. at 6:20.
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told by a judge when sued by the landlord for nonpayment of rent
that a defense based on housing code violations was not permitted
because such a claim was supposedly exclusive to the rent escrow
action, but then unable to make the claim affirmatively in a rent
escrow action because of failure to deposit the amount of alleged
arrears (or the judgment amount resulting from the faster-moving
nonpayment case). For example, in a nonpayment case, a judge
instructed a tenant to take her problem with the conditions to a
separate rent escrow action, and then granted the landlord a judg-
ment against the tenant in the full amount of the alleged ar-
rears.129 The judge overseeing the rent escrow case would not
consider the tenant’s request for damages for the violation of the
warranty of habitability, despite the inspection report indicating
eight housing code violations,five of which were serious,because
she was unable to first deposit the amount of the judgment against
her with the court.130 The judge then dismissed the rent escrow
case, leaving the tenant unable to have warranty claims considered
by either court.131 We even saw a few instances where judges gave
landlords judgments against tenants in the amount of alleged un-
paid rent in rent escrow cases—even in a case where the tenant
defaulted and had no notice that by filing a rent escrow petition
she was exposing herself to a judgment in whatever amount the
landlord claimed was past due rent.132
The evidence of these case studies indicates that the reason
that tenants do not have much success in enforcing the warranty of
habitability in court is because the court under-enforces that law as
written. It is plausible to conclude from these case studies that the
problem is not with the facts of tenant cases or with the law per se
but with reluctance to enforce the law.
III. WHY SUCH COURTS DON’T DELIVER JUSTICE
One of the reasons sometimes surmised for why tenants do so
poorly in enforcing the warranty of habitability is that judges’ ethi-
129 Rent Escrow Hearing at 11:50, 15:15, Boyd III v. Mayberry, Case No.
010100000982012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 98-12).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Rent Escrow Hearing at 8:04, Sturgis v. Anomnachi, Case No. 010100000602012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 60-12) (default case); Rent Escrow Hearing at
6:00, 2:25–11:41, Brown v. Cloverdale Partners, LLC, Case No. 010100099212012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 9921-12); Rent Escrow Hearing at
6:40, Patterson v. Md. Maint. & Mgmt. Co., Case No. 010100000912012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (final order) (on file as 91-2012).
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cal concern for maintaining impartiality impedes them from assist-
ing tenants in establishing their cases.133 However, judicial concern
for impartiality does not seem like a good explanation for what we
saw in our research. For one thing, there is nothing in Maryland’s
Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibits judges from making “rea-
sonable accommodations”134 for unrepresented litigants, as long as
it does not lead to an “unfair advantage” to the litigant who is ac-
commodated.135 Judges merely eliciting the facts relevant to the
remedies available under the warranty of habitability would not be
going beyond making reasonable accommodations—they would in
fact be doing what the statute directs, so that they can “make any
order that the justice of the case may require.”136 In addition, de-
clining to impose the law’s remedies where litigants have estab-
lished a prima facie right to relief, as happened in most of these
cases, does not comport with the usual understanding of judicial
impartiality.
Nor does it seem a potential explanation that judges in rent
escrow cases are reacting to routine abuse of the warranty of habit-
ability by unrepresented tenants. As the example where the judge
upbraided the tenants for “rent avoidance” suggests, suspicion of
tenants’ motives may be a factor in judicial behavior. The sense
that tenants have bad motives would not be an acceptable explana-
tion for failing to do justice in any particular case, but it would at
least provide a psychological account of why the court is not en-
forcing the law. However, our case studies showed that tenants sel-
dom bring legally unjustified rent escrow claims. In fact, in the
fifty-nine cases we examined, we only saw one rent escrow case
where no serious housing code violations were found by the court
inspector137 and only one case where the violations were evidently
caused by the tenant.138 In all the other cases, the tenant had hous-
133 See, e.g., Richard Zorza, The Disconnect between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality
and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions,
Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 424 (2004); Russell
Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22
NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 372 (2008); Baldacci, supra note 25.
134 MD. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2, http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/re
ports/codeofjudicialconduct2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4Q3-SQKW].
135 Id. at R. 2.6.
136 BALT. CITY PUB. LOC. L. § 9-9(f) (2015).
137 See Terri Jones v. Summerfield Inv. Grp. LLC, Case No. 010100001852012 (2012
Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (Checklist for Inspection) (on file as 185-12); Rent Escrow Hear-
ing at 0:10, Terri Jones v. Summerfield Inv. Grp. LLC, Case No. 010100001852012
(2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 185-12).
138 See Kacherovsky v. Ruby, Case No. 9943-12 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (final or-
der) (on file as 9943-12). One other case was difficult to judge, because both parties
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ing code violations of the kind meant to be covered by the law,
usually several and sometimes many. And most of these cases in-
volved record evidence of neglect on the part of the landlord in
making repairs. If judicial behavior reflected a lower opinion of
tenants than of landlords, it does not appear to have been based
on whatever can be found on the record in these cases.
Legal scholars also point to biases on the part of the judges as
a factor in low rates of tenant success in warranty of habitability
cases. David Super, in part, blames “attitudes of the trial judges . . .
[that] genuinely may not result from any organized, conscious de-
cision making”139 and suggests that their behavior may reflect an
underlying belief that poor litigants are less morally worthy than
others.140 Whatever may be the acculturation of judges within the
legal profession to follow the law and to provide equal justice, it is
also true that judges operate within the same larger context as eve-
ryone else, in which low-income persons tend to be stigmatized. A
sense that these litigants are not fully worthy of the protection of
the law may lead judges to stint on its enforcement.
However, other factors may play a substantial, if not more than
substantial, role. Judges are probably more likely to follow the law
if they are in some sense disciplined for not following it, as by an
appellate court that reverses a decision and writes an opinion ex-
plaining the shortcomings of the judge’s decision-making. Judges
also have an incentive to follow the law if they are publicly embar-
rassed for not following it, as through adverse media coverage. And
judges may follow the law because they have been otherwise per-
suaded by legal argument, such as by attorneys practicing before
the court or relevant legal scholarship. Since this court’s decisions
(and in fact those of most civil trial courts handling pro se cases)
are not likely to be appealed, to get media attention, or to be fre-
quently schooled by attorneys or legal scholars, such mechanisms
are not available to affect judicial behavior. The absence of these
features, generally found in more visible courts, may play a role in
the results that these litigants receive.
Because having poor rental housing conditions is likely to cor-
relate strongly with having limited resources, it is not surprising
that the tenants with warranty of habitability complaints can sel-
seemed to be abusive of the law and had involved the police on a regular basis in their
interactions. See Rent Escrow Hearing at 1:13, Milner v. Thompson, Case
No. 010100000282012 (2012 Dist. Ct. Balt. City) (on file as 28-12).
139 Super, supra note 2, at 440.
140 Id. at 395-96, 459-60.
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dom obtain counsel, and that these courts are thus places where
attorneys can have little impact on judicial behavior. In Baltimore,
as virtually everywhere, tenants who live in substandard housing
cannot usually afford to hire an attorney and are unlikely to benefit
from the limited supply of free ones.141 Many landlords who are
small property owners may themselves be unrepresented by an at-
torney in such proceedings—although such landlords as “repeat
players” may be more familiar with how the court works and may
benefit from having greater financial and cultural capital.142 The
lack of counsel means that the parties are particularly dependent
on the court to ensure that the rule of law is applied.
In addition, there are seldom consequences for judges—in
this court and in many courts—for failure to follow the law. Te-
nants often don’t even realize that mistakes of law have been made
by the court, and in any event usually lack the capacity and where-
withal to prosecute an appeal pro se. We even saw instances where
the judge encouraged the tenant to waive the right to appeal—as
the form allowing for the release of escrowed funds actually has a
line on it that releases the funds prior to the expiration of the
thirty-day appeal period if appeal is waived.143 Maryland law further
stymies review and correction of district court mistakes by shunting
tenant “appeals” into a trial de novo in a parallel court,144 which
accomplishes no actual review of the district court decision-mak-
ing. And after the trial de novo, the only available review of legal
mistakes is by certiorari to the State’s highest court, which is rarely
granted. The district court thus functions as all but unreviewable
141 See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CUR-
RENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2005); see also AM. BAR
ASS’N FUND FOR JUSTICE AND EDUC., LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF
AMERICANS (1996); DIST. OF COLUMBIA ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL?:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-
INCOME COMMUNITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7, 9 (2008) (noting that 97% of tenants in
landlord-tenant cases proceeded pro se); Super, supra note 2, at 460 (referring to the
small number of tenants represented in court as having won “the legal aid lottery”).
142 See Super, supra note 2, at 416 (discussing courts’ vulnerability to “capture” by
landlords as repeat players).
143 See Peoples v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No. 010100000352012 (2012 Dist.
Ct. Balt. City) (Order for Disbursement of Escrow Funds and Termination of Court
Escrow) (on file as 35-2012) (“We hereby waive our right to appeal so disbursement
can be made prior to expiration of appeal period.”); see also Rent Escrow Hearing at
2:30, Peoples v. Mid-Atlantic Realty Mgmt., Case No. 10100000352012 (2012 Dist. Ct.
Balt. City) (on file as 35-2012) (“If the parties agree, you can sign where the x’s are
and this will avoid the 30-day appeal period so the money will come back more
quickly.”).
144 See MD. R.C.P. DIST. CT. R. 7-102 (providing for a de novo trial on appeal for
District Court cases where the amount in controversy is less than $5000).
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for mistakes of law, which could very well reduce the court’s incen-
tives for following the law. Indeed, the sheer rarity of appellate re-
view may create the impression that following the law in these cases
is not a priority.
Further, because appeals by tenants are rare, not only do trial
court mistakes go uncorrected, but relatively little appellate gui-
dance on the relevant law gets developed, leaving judges freer to
interpret the law in accordance with personal views. It may also be
the case that any uncertainty about the law that results in an envi-
ronment of limited appellate guidance will be resolved against the
less powerful party in the litigation, which in this situation is the
tenant. Of course, even where there is relevant precedent from the
appellate courts, this multi-case study suggests that a court that has
little chance of being appealed does not have to worry about ac-
countability for not following that precedent.
But there is also an important logistical reality working against
the ability of these courts to enforce the law, and that is the very
large number of cases on their dockets.145 In Williams, the Balti-
more City Housing Authority actually made the argument to the
Maryland Court of Appeals that tenant claims for damages for
breach of the warranty of habitability should not be joined with
rent escrow actions because the court simply would not have time
to hear evidence on damages.146 The Court of Appeals was unper-
suaded, noting that the trial court already had to develop most of
the same evidence in order to rule in the escrow case itself, and so
finding the facts on damages would take little additional time.147
(Of course, that conclusion reflects the assumption that trial
judges are actually finding the relevant facts in rent escrow cases,
while our research indicates that they are not.) The Court of Ap-
peals pointed out that because the vast majority of cases on the
court’s docket are uncontested, judges actually have to hold hear-
ings in only a few of them,148 which suggests that insufficient time
does not affect the adjudication of cases that actually go before the
145 See, e.g., Super, supra note 2, at 434-35.
146 Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 361 Md. 143, 159 (2000) (“[Respondent-
appellee] expresse[d] concern that the trial of warranty [of habitability] claims to-
gether with rent escrow actions would hamper the court’s efficiency in handling the
landlord-tenant dockets.”).
147 Id. at 159-60 (“Except for the period of time involved—the rent escrow case
focusing on the current situation and the breach of warranty action looking back for
some period—the evidence necessary to establish a rent escrow claim will usually be
the same evidence necessary to establish the warranty claim.”).
148 The Court of Appeals pointed out that only a “few of the cases” on the docket
require “an actual adjudication of disputed facts or law.” Id. at 159.
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court. However, that does not mean that time pressure does not
play a substantial role in shaping how the court operates. The large
dockets burdening courts of this kind utterly depend on only a
handful of cases getting significant judicial attention. If judges ac-
tually started enforcing the law, and word of that got around, it
would encourage more tenants to demand the court’s attention.
Concern about keeping that potential flood at bay is likely to yield
procedures and mores that reduce the enforcement of the law.
Thus, the large dockets themselves provide a built-in disincentive
for judges to provide tenants with the relief to which they would
appear to be entitled.
Though lawmakers have established what in many respects
seems like favorable law for tenants who are willing to sue land-
lords for poor conditions, they have not created a system where
that law can readily serve its intended purpose. The system frus-
trates appellate correction and guidance, while imposing such
heavy workloads on judges that the detailed work of following the
law seems like an unaffordable luxury.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE
It is not difficult to imagine what the ideal legal system would
look like. It would be one that enforced the rule of law effectively
in all cases and provided equal justice to unrepresented as well as
represented litigants. But it seems evident that neither the social
commitment nor the fiscal capacity presently exist to provide that
kind of legal system. And if the long failure of warranty of habita-
bility litigation to address the unhealthy and hazardous housing
conditions of our poorest citizens proves anything, it is that there
are unlikely to be any substantial improvements overnight.
One heavily promoted reform is the adoption of a civil Gideon
rule to increase representation of litigants by counsel.149 It is true
that the presence of more lawyers would add something that these
courts are sorely lacking and that many other courts presumably do
benefit from, which is the constant pressure to follow the law and
the education in the law that results when lawyers are involved. But
the provision of more free lawyers is an idea that is losing ground.
149 See, e.g., Andrew Scherer, Why People Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must
Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 699 (2006); Raymond H.
Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer in Evictions Proceedings, 25 TOURO
L. REV. 187, 204-06 (2009); see also Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil
Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 27-28 (1990) (recom-
mending that the Maryland Court of Appeals issue a rule requiring private attorneys
to represent the poor).
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The ratio of free lawyers to low-income litigants has declined over
time,150 and the U.S. Supreme Court shot down the most recent
effort to constitutionalize a right to counsel in civil cases.151 State-
level efforts to mandate more lawyers for low-income civil litigants
have similarly faltered.152 Accordingly, it does not seem to be the
most promising option for improving the situation.
In any event, adding more lawyers would have complicated ef-
fects in this situation. Tenants in rent escrow cases who had lawyers
would presumably be able to seize the lion’s share of the court’s
scarce resources, reducing the access to justice of those who re-
mained unrepresented. And if enough lawyers were added to truly
have an impact on the extent to which tenants’ rights are prose-
cuted, then there would also need to be more judges to adjudicate
the increased number of heavily-litigated cases. Any effort to pro-
vide counsel for all, or even a large number of, such unrepresented
litigants is unlikely to succeed, because lawmakers are aware of the
considerable expense involved—not only of paying for more law-
yers but also for more judges.
There is, in fact, a fundamental mismatch between the cost of
justice in this situation and the benefits provided to the litigants. It
is of course overly simplistic to suggest that it would be more effi-
cient for the judges presiding over these cases to be dismissed and
their salaries reallocated to the cost of fixing up some of these de-
crepit buildings. But it may not be accidental that we have de-
signed a system that mostly channels public funds to expensive
administrative costs that are captured primarily by relatively power-
ful participants in the economic system, rather than to direct bene-
fits to the less powerful. Civil Gideon and other strategies to increase
150 In constant 2013 dollars, funding for the Legal Services Corporation has de-
clined from a high of $848 million in 1980 to $340 million in 2013, the lowest level of
funding in its history. See 2013 LSC By The Numbers, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (July 2014),
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/LSC2013BTN.pdf [http://perma.cc/
SUW6-GHDP]. At the same time, funding provided by interest on lawyers’ trust ac-
counts (IOLTA), which has been used to fund lawyers for the poor, has also drasti-
cally declined, from $371 million in 2007 to $93.2 million in 2011. See also Terry
Carter, IOLTA programs find new funding to support legal services, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Mar.
1, 2013, 7:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/iolta_programs_
find_new_funding_to_support_legal_services [http://perma.cc/KHH6-EBUV]; see
also I. Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 221-22 (2013)
(describing cuts to Legal Services Corporation funding as well as reductions in other
sources of funding for legal services to the poor).
151 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2515-20 (2011).
152 See, e.g., King v. King, 174 P.3d 659, 668 (Wash. 2007) (en banc); Frase v. Barn-
hart, 379 Md. 100, 125 (2003); In re Petition to Establish a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 2012 WI 14 (Feb. 24, 2012) (No. 10-08), http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/
DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=78599 [http://perma.cc/TPQ8-UAEC].
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counsel for unrepresented litigants would exacerbate the alloca-
tion of resources upward rather than downward.
The new legal realists, such as Erlanger, have suggested that
reformists not give in to “a nihilist surrender to pure critique,”153
which is, of course, tempting in this situation. Indeed, after
Bezdek’s extensive research effort involving the Baltimore District
Court, nearly twenty-five years ago now, she herself did not present
any agenda for improving the situation. Rather, she implied that
the problems she documented needed to be solved through poor
people recognizing their role as an exploited group and working
together to bring about change.154 Accordingly, she denounced
even the standard recommendation of more attorneys for the un-
represented as being “parentalistic and . . . let[ting] us off the
hook for our parts in the charade of legal entitlement and rights
vindication.”155 But poor people have not in the twenty-five years
since managed to develop the political clout to obtain noticeable
advances in the enforcement of the warranty of habitability.
Bezdek was no doubt right that having middle-class and affluent
persons drive reform is likely to lead to problematic results, includ-
ing, perhaps, questionable allocations of resources. But if the rule
of law and of equal justice are in fact a societal and systemic con-
cern, then it makes little sense to conceive of the problem as some-
thing we need to wait for poor people to agitate to solve.
Further, as the new legal realists suggest, it may be possible to
“chart[ ] a path between idealism and skepticism, by both remain-
ing cognizant of hierarchies of power and the paradoxes they cre-
ate for law, and also asking what can be done to work toward justice
within the existing structures.”156 There are some more feasible,
comparatively low-cost ways to improve the decision-making of the
less-visible courts that could chart such a path and become the fo-
cus of reform efforts.
For example, the adoption of routinized court processes that
“automatize” the application of law can improve both the speed
and correctness of decision-making.157 More user-friendly petition
153 Erlanger et al., supra note 13, at 345.
154 Bezdek, supra note 24, at 604 (footnote omitted).
155 Id. at 538 n.16.
156 Erlanger et al., supra note 13, at 345.
157 Super has suggested that when reforms are sought to benefit unrepresented
tenants with warranty of habitabilityclaims, “the system’s operation should be as auto-
matic as possible. Relying on low-income people to negotiate evenfairly simple proce-
dures, or on bureaucracies to empathize with them and adjudicate in their favor, all
but guarantees a high failure rate.” Super, supra note 2, at 462; see also ATUL GAWANDE,
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forms for tenants and prescribed adjudication check-lists for judges
could streamline the handling of cases and reduce idiosyncrasies in
how the court operates. In addition, allowing for the participation
of trained lay advocates and parajudicial officers, rather than rely-
ing exclusively on lawyers and judges, would stretch public dollars
further and ensure that more attention is brought to bear on the
cases of the unrepresented.158 Such an approach could also better
distribute expertise so that more expensive resources could be
targeted to more complex cases and less expensive resources to less
complex ones. Further, providing real and meaningful opportuni-
ties for appeal would allow for more appellate correction and gui-
dance. For example, amending the law in Maryland to permit
record appeals would at least allow for the possibility of more ap-
pellate supervision—and also signal that it actually matters whether
the district court enforces the law.
In some sense it can be said that we already have the kind of
legal system we want, one that, for example, displays some concern
for those with substandard housing by giving them legal rights, but
that lacks the social commitment that would enable those rights to
be more than nominally enforced. The fundamentally superficial
nature of our concern would explain why so little has changed over
time and despite repeated efforts by reformers. But it is also true
that the legal system, like all systems, is composed of mechanisms
and procedures that may be tinkered with in ways that could pro-
duce improved outcomes, even without having to change the de-
gree of social commitment. Case study research provides insights
into where such tinkering might most advantageously occur. Fur-
ther, the kind of data that case study research relies upon—data
with a human face and the particulars of human experience—
might even play a role in increasing the social commitment to do
more.
THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO (2009) (discussing generally how checklists increase the
efficacy and consistency of decision-making processes).
158 See generally Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Roles for Non-Lawyers to Increase
Access to Justice, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259 (2014); see also Michele Cotton, Experiment
Interrupted: Unauthorized Practice of Law Versus Access to Justice, 5 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. J.
179 (2012).
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APPENDIX
PRIMA FACIE CASES FOR MONETARY RELIEF
PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL AT
ISSUE
TOTAL AT LANDLORD TENANT AWARDED TO
CASE NO. ISSUE RECEIVED RECEIVED TENANT
171-12 $875 $675 $200 23
53-12 $1460 $1460 $0 0
422-12 $3150 $2250 $900 29
26-12 $1000 $500 $500 50
136-12 $260 $260 $0 0
75-12 $788 $788 $0 0
763-12 $4250 $3350 / 4200 $900 / 50 21 / 1
170-12 $2700 $2025 $675 25
24734-11 $2700 $2700 $0 0
110-12 $800 $800 $0 0
9941-12 $1500 $1500 $0 0
9920-12 $3500 $3500 $0 0
98-12 $640 $640 $0 0
140-12 $2520 $1468 $1052 40
16505-11 $1200 $1200 $0 0
8-12 $3300 $3300 $0 0
24643-11 $3000 $2625 $375 13
92-12 $2700 $2700 $0 0
24798-11 $1654 $1404 $250 15
97-12 $10500 $8750 $1750 17
16683-11 $8125 $5680 $2445 30
56-12 $2958 $2958 $0 0
117-12 $1600 $1600 $0 0
82-12 $480 $0? $480? 100
162-12 $2225 $2225 $0 0
5-12 $7200 $7245 -$45 0
9921-12 $9000 $9000 $0 0
15-12 $3180 $3180 $0 0
73-12 $3500 $2500 $1000 28
39-12 $3600 $0 $3600 100
177-12 $6750 $6750 $0 0
35-12 $795 $795 $0 0
500-11 $5100 $4250 $850 17
